# Governmentality 1AC

## Part 1 is Power

#### Power emerges as a relational from the actions of people, forming a network of domination. This acts prerequisite to all frameworks, as the concept of power is displayed everywhere; theories of domination already assume how power functions.

**Foucault** explains,

Hence the objective is to analyze a certain form of knowl­edge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, but in terms of power. But the word power is apt to lead to a number of misunderstandings-misunderstandings with re­spect to its nature, its form, and its unity. **By power, I do not mean** "Power" as **a group of institutions** and mechanisms **that ensure the subservience of** the **citizens** of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I **[nor] do [I]** not **have in mind a general system of domi­nation exerted by one group over another**, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; **rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes**. It seems to me that **power must be understood** in the first instance **as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate** and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the con­trary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystalliza­tion is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. Power's condi­tion of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise, even in its more "peripheral" effects, and which also makes it possible to use its mech­anisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and de­scendent forms would emanate; **it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of** their **inequality**, constantly **engender states of power**, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. **Power is everywhere**; not because it em­braces everything, but **because it comes from everywhere**. And "Power," insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their move­ment. One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: **power is not an institution**, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; **it is the name that one attrib­utes to a complex** strategical **situation in a particular society**.”

#### By analyzing relations of power we can discover what makes some dominant. Ethics and history have continued to make the mistake of accepting moral laws at face value, while failing to recognize the role of power in producing often violent regimes of truth—this comes first because allows us to understand meaning of rules or norms which are never binding.

**Foucault 2** explains,

**“Emergence is thus the entry of forces;** it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful strength. What Nietzsche calls the Entstehungsherd of [T]he concept of goodness is not specifically the energy of the strong or the reaction of the weak, but precisely this scene where they are displayed superimposed or face-to-face. It is nothing but the space that divides them, the void through which they exchange their threatening gestures and speeches. As descent qualifies the strength or weakness of an instinct and its inscription on a body, **emergence designates a place of confrontation,** but not as a closed field offering the spectacle of a struggle amount equals. Rather, as Nietzsche demonstrates in his analysis of good and evil, it is **a “non-place,”** a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common space. Consequently, no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice. In a sense, **only a single drama is ever staged in this “non-place” the endlessly repeated play of dominations.** The domination of certain men over others leads to the differentiation of values; class domination generates the idea of liberty; and the forceful appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to them account for the origin of logic. **The relationship of domination is** no more a “relationship” than the place where it occurs is a place; and, precisely for this reason, it is **fixed, throughout** its **history**, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations. It establishes marks of its power and engraves memories on things and even within bodies. **It** makes itself accountable for debts and **gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather satisfy it**. Following traditional beliefs, it would be false to think that total war exhausts itself in its own contradictions and ends by renouncing violence and submitting to civil laws. On the contrary, **the law is calculated** and relentless pleasure; delight in the promised blood, **which permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and** the staging of meticulously **repeated scenes of violence. The desire for peace,** the serenity of compromise, **and the** tacit **acceptance of the law,** far from representing a major moral conversion of a utilitarian calculation that gave rise the law, **are but its result and**, in point of fact, **its perversion**: “guilt, conscience, and duty had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of any major event on earth, was saturated in blood.” Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; **humanity installs each of its violence in a system of rules and** thus **proceeds from domination to domination.** The nature of these rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to domination those in power. **Rules are empty in themselves, violence and un-finalized; they** are impersonal and **can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belongs to those** who are **capable of seizing** these **rules, to replaces those who had used them**, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; **controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.** The isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the successive configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals. If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if **interpretation is the violent** or surreptitious **appropriation of a system of rules, which** in itself **has no essential meaning**, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process**.”**

#### Our inherent processes allow us to express this break from domination in the form of creativity – it finds expression in new ideas which shape our lives and give value to our lives. The 1AC is inherently creative as it is a shift from the status quo – otherwise we would keep ourselves tied down to previously held conceptions of reality.

Connolly[[1]](#footnote-1)

If **creativity finds expression in** the human estate, it will sometimes do so at surprising moments during a disruption in a practice, opening the door to a scientific invention, a new concept, a political initiative, **a new social movement**, an artistic innovation, market spontaneity, a language change, a cooking invention, teaching improvisation, a new type of film scene, a musical production, the use of new media, or the invention of a new product. And so on endlessly. **Our identification with life** – our tacit sense of belonging to a human predicament worthy of embrace – is partly rooted in reflexive reconsideration of established desires and ends. But it **is grounded** too **in** those uncanny experiences of **creativity by means of which something new enters the world.** Thismay be one of the reasons people cleave to the sweetness of life. It **[creativity] ties the sweetness of life to a vitality of being**, even more than to a preordained end, purpose, or “fullness” with which it is officially invested. **The intimate relation between freedom and creativity is why freedom is never sufficiently grasped by the idea of a lack to be fulfilled**, successful action upon preset desires, or the drive to render the implicit explicit. The experience of uncertainty or incompleteness is sometimes an occasion of fecundity.

#### Deconstructing governmentality thus becomes the most important framework for the round. As such, the role of the judge is to deconstruct truth through a thorough analysis of knowledge and power.

**Foucault 3** explains,

It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in **[T]he intellectual is not the ‘bearer of universal values.’ Rather,** it’s **the person** occupying a specific position – but **who**se specificity **is linked, in a society like ours, to** the general functioning of an apparatus of **truth**. In other words, the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or ‘organic’ intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, and political and economy demands to which he submits of against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truths in our societies. And **it’s with this** last **factor that [their]** his **position can take on a** general **significance** and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectorial. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. **There is a battle** ‘for truth,’ or at least **‘around truth’** – it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth **and the** economic and political **role it plays**. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. And thus the question of the professionalization of intellectuals and the division between intellectual and manual labour can be envisaged in a new way. All this must seem very confused and uncertain. Uncertain indeed, and what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis. In order for it to be a little less confused, however, I would like to put forward a few ‘propositions’ – not firm assertions, but simply suggestions to be further tested and explained. **‘Truth’ is** to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is **linked** in a circular relation **with\*** system of **powers which** produces and **sustain it**, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. **A regime** of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime **which [is], subject to** certain **modifications**, operates in the socialists countries (I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). **The** essential political problem for the **intellectual is not to criticize** the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or **to ensure that his own** scientific **practice** is accompanied by a correct ideology, **but that of ascertaining the possibility of** constitution a **new** politics of **truth. The problem is** not changing people’s consciousness’s – or what’s in their heads – but **the** political, economic, institutional regime of the **production of truth. It’s** not **a matter** of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but **of detaching the power of truth from** the forms of **hegemony**, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.**”**

Reasons to Prefer: 1. To maintain avenues for political resistance through a deconstruction of power is a pre-requisite. Without potential for resistance, totalizing forms of knowledge that repress non-dominant forms of epistemology and ethics are normalized, creating a façade that makes truth a farce. 2. Knowledge is incomprehensible apart from power. Knowledge cannot have any essence as a concept, as knowledge is merely the fluid trace of origins and concepts. By analyzing the relations between such origins, we can discover what makes some dominant. This means the aff supersedes other methods. 3. It is only through a combat, i.e., a process of creating new truth, rather than judgment, that the value behind truth can be revealed, as what as value can only be determined through defying judgment—precludes neg framework.

## Part 2 is Offense

#### Nothing suits the exercise of “governmentality” better than individualization; it is easier for the state to manage individual interests than a collective community, as individuals, susceptible to desires, are more vulnerable to management by the state without a collective community.

**Foucault 4** explains,

Finally – and here I think we come to the central point of all this – all these mechanisms, unlike those of law or of discipline, do not tend to convey the exercise of a will over others in the most homogeneous, continuous, and exhaustive way possible. It is a matter rather of revealing a level of the necessary and sufficient action of those who govern. This pertinent level of government action is not the actual totality of the subjects in every single detail, but the population with its specific phenomena and processes. **The idea of the panopticon is** a **modern** idea in one sense, **but** we can also say that it is completely **archaic, since the** panoptic **mechanism** basically **involves putting someone in the center**– an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance – **who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals** [placed] **within this machine of power.** To that extent we can say that the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign: None of my subjects can escape and none of their actions is unknown to me. **The central point of the panopticon still functions**, as it were, **as a perfect sovereign**. On the other hand, **what we now see is** [not] the idea of a power that takes the form of an exhaustive surveillance of individuals so that they are all constantly under the eyes of the sovereign in everything they do, but **the set of mechanisms that, for** the government and **those who govern, attach pertinence to quite specific phenomena that are not exactly individual phenomena**, even if individuals do appear in a way, and there are specific processes of individualization (and we will have to come back to this, because it is very important). **The relation between the individual and the collective**, between the totality of the social body and its elementary fragments, **is made to function in a completely different way;** it will function differently in what we call population. **The government of populations is,** I think, completely **different from the exercise of sovereignty over the** fine grain of **individual** behaviors. It seems to me that we have two completely different systems of power **[…]** **The population appears** therefore **as a** kind of thick **natural phenomenon in relation to the sovereign’s legalistic voluntarism**. To say that population is a natural phenomenon that cannot be changed by decree does not mean, however, that it is an inaccessible and impenetrable nature, quite the contrary. And this is where the analysis of the physiocrats and economists becomes interesting, in that the naturalness identified in the fact of population is constantly accessible to agents and techniques of transformation, on condition that these agents and techniques are at once enlightened, reflected, analytical, calculated, and calculating. **Not only must voluntary changes in the law be considered if the laws are unfavorable to the population, but** above all, **if one wants to** encourage population, or **achieve the right relationship between the population and the state**’s resources and possibilities, **then one must act on a range of factors** and elements **that seem far removed from the population itself** and its immediate behavior, fecundity, and desire to reproduce. For example, one must act on the currency flows that irrigate the country, knowing their directions and whether they really reach all the elements of the population or leave some regions inert. One will have to act on exports: the greater the demand for exports, the greater the possibility of work, of course, and so of wealth, and so of population. The problem of imports arises: Do imports encourage or discourage population? If one imports, one takes jobs from people here, but one also gives them food. So there is the problem of the regulation of imports, which was crucial in the eighteenth century. In any case, it is possible to act effectively on the population through the interplay of all these remote factors. So you can see that a completely different technique is emerging that is not getting subjects to obey the sovereign’s will, but having a hold on things that seem far removed from the population, but which, through calculation, analysis, and reflection, one knows can really have an effect on it. I think **a very important mutation in the** organization and **rationalization of methods of power takes place with** reference to this penetrable naturalness of population. We could also say that the naturalness of the population appears in a second way in the fact that this population is of course made up of **individuals who are quite different from each other** and whose behavior, within a certain limit at least, cannot be accurately predicted. Nevertheless, according to the first theorists of population in the eighteenth century, there is at least one invariant that means that the population taken as a whole has one and only one mainspring of action. This is desire. Desire is an old notion that first appeared and was employed in spiritual direction (to which, possibly, we may be able to return),\* and it makes its second appearance within techniques of power and government. **Every individual acts out of desire.** One can do nothing against desire. As Quesnay says: You cannot stop people from living where they think they will profit most and where they desire to live, because they desire that profit. Do not try to change them; things will not change.† However – and **it is here that this naturalness of desire** thus **marks the population and becomes accessible to governmental technique** – for reasons to which we will have to come back and which are one of the important theoretical elements of the whole system, this desire is such that, if one gives it free play, and on condition that it is given free play, all things considered, within a certain limit and thanks to a number of relationships and connections, it will produce the general interest of the population. **Desire is the pursuit of the individual’s interest. In his desire the individual may well be deceived regarding his personal interest**, but there is something that does not deceive, which is that the spontaneous, or at any rate both spontaneous and regulated play of desire will in fact allow the production of an interest, of something favorable for the population. **The production of the collective interest through** the play of **desire is what distinguishes both the naturalness of population and the** possible artificiality of the **means one adopts to manage it.** This is important because you can see that with this idea of a management of populations on the basis of the naturalness of their desire, and of the spontaneous production of the collective interest by desire, we have something that is completely the opposite of the old ethical-juridical conception of government and the exercise of sovereignty. For what was the sovereign for the jurists, for medieval jurists but also for the theorists of natural law, for Hobbes as well as for Rousseau? **The sovereign is the person who can say no to any individual’s desire, the problem being how to legitimize this “no”** opposed to individuals’ desire **and found it on the will of these same individuals**. Now through the economic-political thought of the physiocrats we see a completely different idea taking shape, which is that the problem of those who govern must absolutely not be how they can say no, up to what point they can say no, and with what legitimacy they can say no. The problem is how they can say yes; it is how to say yes to this desire. The problem is not therefore the limit of concupiscence or the limit of self-esteem in the sense of love of oneself, but concerns rather everything that stimulates and encourages this self- esteem, this desire, so that it can produce its necessary beneficial effects. We have here therefore the matrix of an entire, let’s say, utilitarian philosophy.\* And just as I think that Condillac’s Ideology,† or, in short, what has been called sensualism, was the theoretical instrument by which the practice of discipline could be underpinned,‡ I would say that utilitarian philosophy was the theoretical instrument that underpinned the government of populations, which was something new at this time. (93-94 and 100-102)

The aff outweighs: biopower means that our thoughts are regulated, causing us to believe that things are natural, including the government that biopolitically manages our lives. The aff holds the internal link because confronting this form of biopower sets precedent for future deconstruction.

**And, An armed society fosters a society of individuals, isolated by the illusion that guns provide protection. Rather than deterring state biopower, a gun culture undermines our freedom and social cohesion.**

**Debrabander** explains,

**Gun rights advocates** also **argue that guns provide the ultimate insurance of our freedom**, in so far **as they are the final deterrent against encroaching** centralized **government**, and an executive branch run amok with power. **Any suggestion of limiting guns rights is greeted by ominous warnings that this is a move of expansive**, would-be **despotic government**. It has been the means by which gun rights advocates withstand even the most seemingly rational gun control measures. An assault weapons ban, smaller ammunition clips for guns, longer background checks on gun purchases — these are all measures centralized government wants, they claim, in order to exert control over us, and ultimately impose its arbitrary will. I have often suspected, however, that **contrary to holding centralized authority in check,** broad **individual gun ownership gives the powers-that-be** exactly **what they want**. After all, **a population of privately armed citizens** is one that **is increasingly fragmented**, and vulnerable as a result. **Private gun ownership invites retreat into** extreme **individualism** — I heard numerous calls for homeschooling in the wake of the Newtown shootings — **and nourishes the illusion that I can be my own police,** or military, as the case may be. The N.R.A. would have each of us steeled for impending government aggression, but it goes without saying that individually armed citizens are no match for government force. The N.R.A. argues against that interpretation of the Second Amendment that privileges armed militias over individuals, and yet it seems clear that armed militias, at least in theory, would provide a superior check on autocratic government. As Michel Foucault pointed out in his detailed study of the mechanisms of power, **nothing suits power so well as extreme individualism**. In fact, he explains, **political and corporate interests aim at nothing less than “individualization,” since it is far easier to manipulate a collection of** discrete and **increasingly independent individuals than a community. Guns undermine** just that — **community. Their pervasive**, open **presence** **would sow apprehension**, suspicion, **mistrust and fear**, all emotions that are corrosive of community and civic cooperation. To that extent, then, **guns give license to autocratic government. Our gun culture** promotes a fatal slide into extreme individualism. It **fosters a society of atomistic individuals, isolated before power** — and one another — **and** in the aftermath of shootings such as at Newtown, **paralyzed with fear. That is not freedom, but quite its opposite**. And as the Occupy movement makes clear, also the demonstrators that precipitated regime change in Egypt and Myanmar last year, assembled masses don’t require guns to exercise and secure their freedom, and wield world-changing political force. Arendt and Foucault reveal that power does not lie in armed individuals, but in assembly — and everything conducive to that.

**Implications: 1. Managerialism through the state is facilitated by gun culture as individuals and their desires are easier to regulate than collective bodies. The panopticon separates prisoners for a reason. The state will always try to invent new ways to gain control over a population, but individuals need to maximize their avenues for resistance by forming communities based on trust, rather than fear. The principal of the aff is always net beneficial. 2. Only a ban solves. If private ownership is permissible, then it becomes harder to form a collective community that is based on trust. Even if handguns are still obtained illegally in the aff world, that doesn’t mean that the community can’t still form resistance to prevent governmentality. Turns to the aff manifest as arguments why gun culture prevents managerialism. 3. Aff outweighs—handgun ownership undermines the freedom necessary to speak freely to resist political structures and governmentality. Gun culture makes the impact systemic. Violence is a pre-political manner of control uncharacteristic to democratic organizations. Guns undermine the essence of democracy and merely reproduce notions of control.**

**Debrabander 2** explains,

This becomes clear if only you pry a little more deeply into the N.R.A.’s logic behind an armed society. **An armed society is polite**, by their thinking, **precisely because guns would compel everyone to tamp down** eccentric **behavior**, and refrain from actions that might seem threatening. **The suggestion is that guns** liberally **interspersed throughout society would cause us** all **to** walk gingerly — not make any sudden, unexpected moves — and **watch what we say, how we act, whom we** might **offend**. As our Constitution provides, **however, liberty entails precisely the freedom to be reckless, within limits,** also the freedom **to insult and offend** as the case may be. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld our right to experiment in offensive language and ideas, and in some cases, offensive action and speech. **Such experimentation is inherent to** our **freedom** as such. **But guns** by their nature **do not mix with this** experiment — they don’t mix with taking offense. **They are combustible ingredients in assembly and speech**. I often think of the armed protestor who showed up to one of the famously raucous town hall hearings on Obamacare in the summer of 2009. The media was very worked up over this man, who bore a sign that invoked a famous quote of Thomas Jefferson, accusing the president of tyranny. But no one engaged him at the protest; no one dared approach him even, for discussion or debate — though this was a town hall meeting, intended for just such purposes. Such is the effect of **guns** on speech — and assembly. Like it or not, they **transform the bearer, and end the conversation** in some fundamental way. **They announce** that **the conversation is not completely unbounded**, unfettered **and free;** there is or can be a limit to negotiation and debate — definitively. **The very power and possibility of free speech and assembly rests on** their **non-violence. The power of** the **Occupy** Wall Street **movement, as well as the Arab Spring protests, stemmed precisely from their non-violent nature**. This power was made evident by the ferocity of government response to the Occupy movement. Occupy protestors across the country were increasingly confronted by police in military style garb and affect. Imagine what this would have looked like had the protestors been armed: in the face of the New York Police Department assault on Zuccotti Park, there might have been armed insurrection in the streets. **The non-violent nature of protest** in this country **ensures that it can occur.**

Handgun ownership compels individuals to refrain from actions that might seem threatening or radical and undermines the freedom necessary to speak freely to resist hegemonic political structures—I outweigh. Banning handguns opens up political avenues for dissent. Gun culture furthers the creation of a securitized state. Even if strict regulations on guns are effective, my argument is about addressing the stigma and mentality associated with guns. Because guns undermine communities only a prohibition on handguns prevents the individualization that facilitates state biopolitical control; strict rules and regulations are always inferior to a prohibition because a ban on handguns prevents the illusion that citizens can stop the state on their own.

**Gun laws spill over to change cultural assumptions that cause violence – means norms of American society itself will change**

**LaFolette 2k** (Gun Control, Hugh, Ethics, Vol. 110 (2000), pp. 263-81)

**The strong correlation between** the presence of **guns and** a higher **murder** rate **is compelling. Since the correlation is statistically significant** to a .01 level, it is difficult to believe that limiting private gun ownership will not have a noticeable effect on the numbers of murders. **Gun advocates** disagree: they **claim that cultural factors explain the correlation**. Al- though I think they are partly correct, they draw the wrong inference. For one crucial difference between European and American cultures is the widespread presence of guns. **[But] Each culture is the way it is,** at least in part, **because of the role of guns** (or their absence) played in its creation and maintenance. **Therefore, curtailing the private possession of guns might well change the American culture** so that it would be less violent. Consequently, **it is not only that fewer guns would directly cause some decline** in violent crimes—which it should. **It is also likely to reshape the cultural values**, which, along with the ready availability of deadly weapons, led to such an extraordinarily high murder rate in America. SK

## Underview. Bans are effective

**a. Highest quality data flows aff—handguns are specifically key.**

**Dixon 2011** (Nicolas, associate professor philosophy @ Alma College, “Handguns, Philosophers and the Right to Self-Defense,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2011)

Before turning to nonconsequentialist defenses of handguns based on the right to self-defense, a brief sketch of my original utilitarian argument for prohibition is in order. Its starting point is a striking set of international data. **The U**nited **S**tates **far outstrips** five **other developed countries** (Australia, Canada, Israel, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) **in** both **handgun ownership and handgun homicide rates** per 100,000 people. **The** United States’ **handgun homicide rate is** over **twenty times greater** than that in these other countries, **and its handgun ownership rate is over nine times as high**. My reason for singling out handguns for prohibition in the United States is that they are, in this country, the firearm of choice for criminals, being used in at least 72.2 percent of firearms homicides in the years 2006-2010. **Substantially reducing the number of handguns in the U.S. will very likely** substantially **reduce** the rate of total **homicide**. This prediction is based not only on noted statistics, but also on the following considerations, which constitute a rudimentary casual theory. First, a large proportion of these crimes is currently committed with handguns. Since 1970, approximately one-half of the homicides in the U.S. have been committed with handguns. In 2006-2010, an average of 6,909 homicides (48.7 percent of all homicides) was committed per year with handguns. Second, because of their cheapness, concealability, ease of use, and lethality, handguns are ideally suited to the commission of crimes and criminals are highly unlikely to be able to commit as many violent crimes by switching to alternative weapons. Third, other weapons that assailants might substitute for firearms are far less lethal than handguns, and in the case of firearms other than handguns, although the wounds that they inflict are more serious, their lower concealability makes it harder to inflict wounds in the first place.’ **Since** the appearance of **my first articles, social scientists have performed** far more sophisticated **statistical analyses of much more comprehensive comparative data**, and they **provide strong support for my causal hypothesis that prohibition would reduce homicide** in the US. **In three separate studies** of fourteen, eighteen, and twenty-one countries, Martin **Killias** has **found** that **the prevalence of firearms is strongly correlated with the firearms homicide rate. The first study indicated** a correlation of .746 (where 1 is a perfect correlation), with **a probability of less than 0.01 that this would happen by chance**, the second produced a correlation of .476--.610 (p<0.031) and the third indicated a correlation of .43 (p<0.05) when the countries with extreme scores are excluded. More important, both Killias’s and other studies have shown a correlation between gun ownership and total (gun plus non-gun) homicide rates. Most notably, **in a 2000 study of twenty-six high-income countries**, David **Hemenway and** Matthew **Miller found a correlation of .69** (p<0.00). This study is of special interest because it investigated twenty-six of the twenty-seven countries with a population of over one million defined by the World Bank as high income or highly industrialized. **Focusing on a more homogenous group of countries helps to narrow attention to the variable in question**—firearms—**and minimizes the confounding effect** of other causes of homicide. Hemenway and Miller’s study found that the overall homicide rate in the U.S. was 5.98 times higher than in any other twenty-five countries, obviating the objection that the total homicide rate in these other countries could be just as high as in the U.S., due to ‘non-handgun homicides.

**b. Australia proves gun bans are effective—solved homicides, suicides, robberies, and caused cultural shift that ensured long-term effectiveness.**

**Donohue 8/27**(John, C Wendell and Edith M Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford University, "Ban guns, end shootings? How evidence stacks up around the world," 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/27/opinions/us-guns-evidence/)>

In the wake of the massacre, the conservative federal government succeeded in implementing tough **new gun control laws** throughout the country. A large array of weapons were banned -- including the Glock semiautomatic handgun used in the Charleston shootings. The government also imposed a mandatory gun buy back that substantially **reduced gun possession in Australia.** The effect was that **both gun suicides and homicides** (as well as total suicides and homicides)**fell**. In addition, the 1996 legislation made it a crime to use firearms in self-defense. When I mention this to disbelieving NRA supporters they insist that crime must now be rampant in Australia. In fact, **the Australian murder rate has fallen to close to one per 100,000 while the U.S. rate,** thankfully lower than in the early 1990s, **is still** roughly at 4.5 per 100,000-- over **four times as high**. Moreover, **robberies in Australia occur at only about half the rate of the U.S**. (58 in Australia versus 113.1 per 100,000 in the U.S. in 2012). How did Australia do it? Politically, it took a brave prime minister to face the rage of Australian gun interests. John Howard wore a bullet-proof vest when he announced the proposed gun restrictions in June 1996. The deputy prime minister was hung in effigy. But Australia did not have a domestic gun industry to oppose the new measures so the will of the people was allowed to emerge. And today, **support for the** safer, **gun-restricted Australia is so strong that going back would not be tolerated** by the public. **That Australia hasn't had a mass shooting since 1996 is likely more than** merely **the result of the** considerable **reduction in guns** -- it's certainly not the case that guns have disappeared altogether. I suspect that **the country has also experienced a cultural shift** between the shock of the Port Arthur massacre and the removal of guns from every day life as they are no longer available for self-defense and they are simply less present throughout the country. **Troubled individuals**, in other words, **are not constantly being reminded that guns are a means to address** their alleged **grievances** to the extent that they were in the past, or continue to be in the US.

**c. The most comprehensive study, which takes evidence from all 50 states into account proves that gun laws reduce gun violence.**

**AP 2013** (Lindsey Tanner, “More gun laws fewer deaths, 50-state study says”, AP

**States with the most gun control laws have the fewest gun-related deaths**, according to a study that suggests sheer quantity of measures might make a difference. But the research leaves many questions unanswered and won't settle the debate over how policymakers should respond to recent high-profile acts of gun violence. In the dozen or so states with the most gun control-related laws, far fewer people were shot to death or killed themselves with guns than in the states with the fewest laws, the study found. Overall, states **with** the most laws had **a 42 percent lower gun death rate** than states with the least number of laws. **The results are based on an analysis of 2007-2010 gun-related homicides and suicides from the [CDC]** federal **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.** The **researchers also used data on gun control measures in all 50 states compiled by the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence**, a well-known gun control advocacy group. They compared states by dividing them into four equal-sized groups according to the number of gun laws. The results were published online Wednesday in the medical journal JAMA Internal Medicine. More than 30,000 people nationwide die from guns every year nationwide, and there's evidence that gun-related violent crime rates have increased since 2008, a journal editorial noted. During the four-years studied, there were nearly 122,000 gun deaths, 60 percent of them suicides. "Our motivation was really to understand what are the interventions that can be done to reduce firearm mortality," said Dr. Eric Fleegler, the study's lead author and an emergency department pediatrician and researcher at Boston Children's Hospital. He said his study suggests but doesn't prove that gun laws — or something else — led to fewer gun deaths. Fleegler is also among hundreds of doctors who have signed a petition urging President Barack Obama and Congress to pass gun safety legislation, a campaign organized by the advocacy group Doctors for America. Gun rights advocates have argued that strict gun laws have failed to curb high murder rates in some cities, including Chicago and Washington, D.C. Fleegler said his study didn't examine city-level laws, while gun control advocates have said local laws aren't as effective when neighboring states have lax laws. Previous research on the effectiveness of gun laws has had mixed results, and it's a "very challenging" area to study, said Dr. Daniel Webster, director of the Johns Hopkins Center For Gun Policy. He was not involved in the current study. **The strongest kind of research would require comparisons between states that have dissimilar gun laws** but otherwise are nearly identical, "but there isn't a super nice twin for New Jersey," for example, a state with strict gun laws, Webster noted. Fleegler said his **[The] study's conclusions took into account factors also linked with gun violence,** including poverty, education levels and race, **which vary among the states.**  The average annual gun death rate ranged from almost 3 per 100,000 in Hawaii to 18 per 100,000 in Louisiana. Hawaii had 16 gun laws, and along with New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts was among states with the most laws and fewest deaths. States with the fewest laws and most deaths included Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana and Oklahoma

# 1AR

## Extensions

Extend **Foucault 1**—power emerges as a relational from the actions of people, forming a network because it arises from a multiplicity of forces and is everywhere. This acts as a pre-requisite to all frameworks; they already assume how power functions.

Extend **Foucault 2**—analyzing relations of power allows us to discover what makes some dominant. Ethics and history have continued to make the mistake of accepting moral laws at face value, while failing to recognize the role of power in producing violent truth—means the aff precludes because it allows us to understand purpose of knowledge.

Extend the analysis beneath Foucault 2, which explains that **governmentality**, a concept that describes the tendency of political regimes to frame “truths” as reality and natural, is the final stage of power, as governments regulate not only our physical lives but also our production of knowledge and thought. Outweighs because it demonstrates how governments act to produce our thoughts and skews the starting point of discussion all issues, precluding the neg.

Extend **Foucault 3**—the role of the judge is to deconstruct truth through an analysis of knowledge and power. This is the specific role of the intellectual because it is precisely the intellectual who is in a position to analyze and structure the function of truths. The judge assumes the role of the intellectual because the ballot has the power to determine which forms of power and knowledge are endorsed.

Three other reasons to prefer:

1. To maintain avenues for political resistance through a deconstruction of power is a pre-requisite. Without potential for resistance, totalizing forms of knowledge that repress non-dominant forms of epistemology and ethics are normalized, creating a façade that makes truth a farce.

2. Knowledge is incomprehensible apart from power. Knowledge cannot have any essence as a concept, as knowledge is merely the fluid trace of origins and concepts. By analyzing the relations between such origins, we can discover what makes some dominant. This means the aff supersedes other methods.

3. It is only through a combat, i.e., a process of creating new truth, rather than judgment, that the value behind truth can be revealed, as what as value can only be determined through defying judgment—precludes neg framework.

Extend **Foucault 4**—nothing suits “governmentality” better than individualization; it is easier for the state to manage individual interests than a collective community, as individuals, susceptible to desires, are more vulnerable to management and influence. The panopticon is successfully only because individuals are separated and can’t form communities.

Extend the weighing with Foucault 4—aff outweighs since biopower produces and regulates our thoughts, causing us to believe that things are natural. The aff holds the **internal link** because confronting this form of biopower sets the stage for future deconstruction.

Extend **Debrabander**—an armed society fosters a society of individuals, isolated by the illusion that guns provide protection. Rather than deterring state biopower, handguns undermine freedom and social cohesion.

**And**, Debrabander implies that I don’t need to win that there are less guns, rather than the principle of undermining gun culture through bans is beneficial; the principal of the aff is always net beneficial. Even if guns still exist, the legal culture changes and individuals still don’t live in a society structured by fear and individualism.

Implications:

1. Only a ban solves. If private ownership is permissible, then it becomes harder to form a collective community that is based on trust. Even if handguns are still obtained illegally in the aff world, that doesn’t mean that the community can still form resistance to prevent governmentality. Turns to the aff manifest as arguments why gun culture prevents managerialism.

2. Aff outweighs—handgun ownership undermines the freedom necessary to speak freely to resist political structures and governmentality—that’s **Debrabander 2**. Gun culture makes the impact systemic. Violence is a pre-political manner of control uncharacteristic to democratic organizations. Guns undermine the essence of democracy and merely reproduce notions of control.

Extend that Debrabander 2 functions as **offense** under the aff framework because handgun ownership compels individuals to refrain from actions that might seem threatening or radical, undermining the freedom necessary to speak freely to resist hegemonic structures. I outweigh because banning handguns open up avenues for **political dissent, which is much more likely to succeed**.

### Creativity Extension

GAME OVER you concede the apriori – extend Connoly which says that creativity is independently key to any action. Then extend the fact that the 1AC is inherently creative because it is a shift from the status quo – it is a different social form which means that you vote aff.

### Rules Extension

**1.** GAME OVER you thought this aff wasn’t tricky: shame on you – you have conceded Foucault 2 which says that any sort of rule or norm is empty which means that your interpretation has no value and is not binding which is terminal defense on all of your interps. There is no net benefit, i.e. no offense on reading theory. Also you’ve conceded that rules are never binding which means that there is no concrete meaning on a rule – this argument is literally rule following skep – it means that I meet your interpretation because all rules can be met.

## 1AR vs. Theory

**Extend Foucault 2—analyzing relations of power allows us to discover what makes some dominant. Ethics and history have continued to make the mistake of tacitly accepting norms at face value, while failing to recognize the role of power in producing violent truth. Their interp, proposing a “rule for debate” or a “good norm for debate” ACTIVELY links into this criticism and demonstrates the validity of Foucault’s genealogy. Interps, appealing to standards of fairness and education, impose rules that create forms of knowledge and doing in the debate space, hence creating forms of power.**

**Thus, extend Foucault 3—the role of the judge is to deconstruct truth through an analysis of knowledge and power. This is specific role of the judge because the ballot has the power to determine which forms of truth are endorsed. This is the only role of the judge because it is precisely the intellectual who is in a position to analyze the function of truths. This makes the aff a PRE-REQUISITE to theory for four reasons: First, extend that to maintain avenues for resistance we must understand the tendency of power to create totalizing forms of knowledge that repress non-dominant forms of epistemology and practice. This makes their appeals to fairness and education a farce. Fairness and education are supposed to enhance the quality of the debate space, but in fact merely justify the creation of hegemonic norms in the debate space, contradicting their function. This is an impact turn to the voter, as the appeals to fairness and education, without first deconstructing truth, actually totalize and repress non-dominant forms of knowledge, which is unfair and uneducational by their logic. This is a reason why they should lose. Second, extend that knowledge cannot be comprehended apart from power. Knowledge cannot have any essence as a concept, as knowledge is merely the fluid trace of origins and concepts. This means that aff supersedes the theory voter and needs to be evaluated first. Fairness and education are empty without first deconstructing what gives rise to dominant formations of truth. Third, extend that it is only through a combat, i.e., a process of creating new truth, rather than judgment, that the value behind truth can be revealed, as what as value can only be determined through defying judgment. This means the aff framework PRECLUDES theory because fairness and education have absolutely no value without deconstructing first. Fourth, Foucault 2 and 3 collectively imply that understanding the meaning of creating “interpretations” or “rules” and appealing to voters, like fairness and education, is only possible through the aff framework because truth and power are intimately connected—one cannot exist without the other. The aff needs to come first for their impacts to make any sense.**

**This implies fairness isn’t a pre-requisite to evaluation, but the aff framework is; their arguments about fairness being constitutive to debate aren’t only false because debate can have multiple functions, but links further back into the critique as it demonstrates the tendency of hegemonic norms, like fairness, to attempt to seem natural and normal—that literally proves every single argument I’m making.**

**And, don’t let the neg respond to the substance of the conceded arguments—they had plenty of opportunity to do so in the first speech. The implications of these arguments were clear in the first speech. Even if the neg is allowed to respond, they should only be able to respond to the implications of the arguments, not the warrants themselves because those responses would absolutely be new.**

**Theory is likewise an example of the academic procedural dogma that inhibits creative thinking and unique problem-solving strategies. Engaging debate on debate’s terms to weed out arguments that challenge its assumptions feeds into an ever-growing system of censorship that control who is allowed to access certain knowledge. This means the aff outweighs fairness because it militarizes the debate space and prevents fluid thought.**

**Bleiker explains,**

Bleiker 2000 [Roland, Senior Lecturer at the University of Queensland, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics*, pgs 18-19] **Gazing beyond the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge is necessary to open up questions of** traversal **dissent and** human **agency. Academic disciplines,** by virtue of what they are, **discipline the production** and diffusion **of knowledge. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods,** techniques, and instruments **that are** considered **proper for this purpose. Such conventions not only suggest on what ground things can be studied legitimately, but also decide what issues are worthwhile** to be assessed in the first place**. Thus, as soon as one addresses academic disciplines on their own terms, one has to play according to the rules of a discursive “police” which is reactivated each time one speaks.** In this case**, [O]ne cuts off any innovative thinking spaces that exist on the other side of this margin.**

**This implies that their fairness standards contribute to forms of academic regulation that precludes education, producing a performative contradiction between their two voters. You need to reject the neg’s academic censorship in favor of a creative and spontaneous outlook for debate that allows debaters to use their arguments to express their agency—that’s the first part of Bleiker. They should be dropped for running theory because they militarize the debate space, alienating and excluding certain arguments for arbitrary concepts, such as fairness and education. This means theory is an internal contradiction because it produces violent and dangerous norms for debate.**

**They will argue that fairness is a prerequisite to evaluation, but that doesn’t answer every single implication of Foucault, which explains why such arguments are not well warranted and empty.**

**Even if you don’t buy any of these arguments so far again the conceded analysis under Foucault 2 that argues that governmentality, which is the tendency of political regimes to frame “truths” as reality and as natural, results in government being able to control not just our physical lives but our knowledge production. This outweighs because it skews the starting point of all discussions, including theory, which is influenced by notions of “normal”—fairness absolutely describes this.**

**Always prefer these arguments because the neg did not do NEARLY enough work on these arguments in the 1NR—they had a chance to respond. They should lose for running theory because it promotes bad standards for debate. Either way, evaluate the aff first. Now, I’ll win on substance. They conceded way too many framing arguments, which have all been extended, I win on substance under my framework…**

## A2 Foucault Women K

**1.** This argument is just nonsensical—Foucault dedicated a large portion of the history of sexuality to the hysterical women, which specifically analyzed how middle-class patriarch norms influenced the sexuality of women. Specifically, Foucault argues that the women’s body is viewed as hysterical, i.e., overly emotional and irrational. This manifested itself in policies, such as the Female Refuges Act in Canada and physicians like Dr. Richard Bucke. Foucault then analyzed how the women’s body had a sexual meaning that shifted from being viewed as hysterical to hypersexual, with a focus on working-class women, in particular.

**2.** Foucault’s analysis itself doesn’t exclude women. The method of Foucault, which is endorsed by the 1AC can be used to understand norms of patriarchy and gender roles. In fact, many scholars use Foucault to analyze the difference between Indigenous and Western expressions of gender. They could’ve operated under my framework with any argument pertaining to feminism or women in general.

**3.** PERM—use Foucault’s analysis to understand how women are specifically affected by the mindset of governmentality. The net benefit is that we still gain an understanding of how governmentality works, while focusing on the role of the female in producing hegemonic power relations.

**4.** TURN—using a deconstruction of govermentality allows us to understand how norms like patriarchy and other hegemonic truths affect women.

**5.** PERM—do the AC and then the K. Govermentality is a pre-requisite because we need to understand how we can resist government structures and form the communities necessary to deconstruct truth before we organize around broader issues. Method always comes first.

## A2 Ban Doesn’t Solve

## AT: Framework Responses

## AT: Contention Level

### AT: Substitution Effect

### AT: Illegal Market

1. **Extend the analytic under Debrabander 1** that Even if handguns are still obtained illegally in the aff world, that doesn’t mean that the community can’t still form resistance to prevent governmentality which delinks your impact from the aff

2. The aff is about changing a mentality – even if there is an illegal market those who have faith in the government would not engage in it

3. **Extend the analytic under Debrabander 2** that the ban introduces political avenues for dissent regardless of whether or not guns actually go away because even if regulations are not effective, my argument addresses the stigma associated with guns.

4. **Extend Debrabander** - implies that I don’t need to win that there are less guns, rather than the principle of undermining gun culture through bans is beneficial; the principal of the aff is always net beneficial. Even if guns still exist, the legal culture changes and individuals still don’t live in a society structured by fear and individualism.

5. **Extend LaFollette** – the ban would change the gun culture which would in turn reduce demand for illegal guns – terminal defense.

### AT: Guns in Revolt

A. Turn - This ability to revolt is what allows the government to gain power under the illusion that we have the power

B. Handguns cant do anything against the might of the government

C. Extend the analytic under Debrabander 2 – the idea that we can stop the state on our own is the illusion the government uses to divide the polity

1. William Connolly (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University). The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Duke University Press. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)